The discourse of anarchy in IR

JACK DONNELLY
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, USA

E-mail: Jack.Donnelly@du.edu

Contemporary International Relations (IR) typically treats anarchy as a fundamental, defining, and analytically central feature of international relations. Furthermore, it is usually held that IR since its inception has been structured around a discourse of anarchy. In fact, however, until the 1980s anarchy was rarely employed as a central analytical concept, as I show by examining 145 books published between 1895 and 1978. The conceptual and analytic centrality of anarchy is not imposed on us by international reality. Rather, it is a recent and contingent construction. Given the shortcomings of standard uses of ‘anarchy’ – especially the facts that there is no clear, generally agreed upon definition, that ‘the effects of anarchy’ are not effects of anarchy (alone), and that anarchy is not the structural ordering principle of international systems – I argue for returning to earlier practice and putting anarchy back in the background of IR.

Keywords: anarchy; history of IR; structure

Contemporary IR typically treats anarchy as a ‘fundamental’ (Milner 1991, 67; Schmidt 1998, 1; Miller 2002, 10; Holmes 2011, 291) feature of international relations; ‘the defining characteristic of international politics’ (Krasner 1992, 48). ‘Virtually all scholars agree that relations between states are anarchic and that this is one of the most unique, important, and enduring features of world politics’ (Lake 2009, 2). It is also commonly held that ‘the field of international relations has, from its earliest years, been structured by a discourse about anarchy’ (Schmidt 1998, 41).

Actually, however, until the 1980s IR rarely employed anarchy as a central analytical concept. Part One shows that anarchy, rather than a constant and objectively necessary feature of the study of international relations, is a recent discursive construction.

Part Two argues that American IR’s construction of anarchy as both demarcating the discipline and a major structural and explanatory variable cannot succeed. Any definition that plausibly makes anarchy a feature of (nearly) all international systems has no interesting substantive implications. Any definition that gives ‘anarchy’ determinate effects or makes it a plausible
structural ordering principle, however, renders anarchy a feature of a subset of international systems.

Part Two shows that (American) IR uses ‘anarchy’ in multiple, shifting senses; that anarchy has no effects; and that anarchy does not structure international systems. I conclude by further explicating the idea of the construction of anarchy and arguing for putting anarchy (back) in the background of the discipline.

Part one: the construction of anarchy in contemporary IR

I begin by demonstrating a fundamental discursive transformation following the publication in 1979 of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics.

The pattern of usage

This section lays out the evidence, looking quantitatively at more than 200 books published between 1895 and 2013; surveying the general pattern of usage before 1979; and examining six interwar books that make central reference to anarchy.

Quantitative evidence

I begin by counting occurrences of ‘anarchy’ and ‘anarchic’ in 92 books published between 1895 and 1945, 53 published between 1946 and 1978, and 62 published between 1979 and 2013.¹ Appendices 1–3, which for reasons of space are available online,² list the books and the number of occurrences per book. (Works cited in this essay – a third of the total – have the author’s name in small caps in the reference list and the number of occurrences in square brackets at the end of the entry.) Appendices 1 and 2 also quote all electronically available passages in pre-1979 books that use the terms less than 20 times, allowing interested readers access to most of the ‘raw data’ for the pre-1979 period.

Table 1 shows a striking pattern. Before 1979 the median number of uses of ‘anarchy’ or ‘anarchic’ is 2. After 1978 the median is 24. Before 1979 three-fifths of the books use ‘anarchy’ or ‘anarchic’ three or fewer times. After 1978 four-fifths use these terms 10 or more times. Moreover, the

² See http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000111.
Note: Appendices are attached to the end of this file.
Appendix 1 begins on p. 34.
pattern is essentially the same for 1895–1945 and 1946–78. A sharp transition occurs around the publication of *Theory of International Politics*. This transition is nicely illustrated in ‘handbooks’ of the discipline. The IR volume of Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby’s (1975) *Handbook of Political Science* contains 11 occurrences of ‘anarchy’ or ‘anarchic,’ six of which are in the chapter by Waltz, with a seventh in the index (which references only pages in the Waltz chapter). The *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, (2002, 2013) contains 86 occurrences in both its 2002 and 2013 editions. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal’s (2008) *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* has over a hundred.

The same pattern is evident in James Dougherty and William Pfaltzgraff’s *Contending Theories of International Relations*, a well-known IR Theory textbook. The 1971 and 1981 editions use ‘anarchy’ and ‘anarchic’ five and seven times, respectively. The 1990 and 1997 editions use them 20 and 56 times.

‘Anarchy’ was not even widely employed in pre-Waltzian realism. For example, the term occurs only twice, in passing, in E. H. Carr’s (1964 [1946], 28, 162) *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, in George Kennan’s (1951, 33, 149) *American Diplomacy*, and in Henry Kissinger’s (1957, 17, 25) *A World Restored*. None of the seven editions of Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* contains an index entry for anarchy.3 *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (1946, 117) refers once to ‘the international anarchy of our age,’ not international relations in general; *In Defense of the National Interest* (1951, 102, 103) uses the term twice, both times indicating disorder.

---

3 Furthermore, most of the passages in the first edition associate anarchy with disorder and violence (Morgenthau 1948, 138, 174, 210, 310, 311, 361, 378, 431).
**The pattern of usage in pre-1979 IR**

A quarter of my pre-1979 books do not use ‘anarchy’ or ‘anarchic’ at all. Another quarter use them only once or twice. Moreover, of those that do employ the terms, almost half (52 of 107) use the ordinary language sense of disorder in half or more of the total occurrences.

This largely explains the relatively infrequent use of anarchy. As ‘anarchy’ lacked a well-established technical sense there was little reason to use it often.

In a few, usually isolated, passages anarchy is presented as a general feature of international relations. The most common ‘technical’ sense, however, indicates the external juridical consequences of state sovereignty. ‘Sovereignty was a doctrine of legal anarchy’ (Fenwick 1934, 47). ‘Juristically speaking, there exists a condition of anarchy’ (Hill 1911, 15, cf. 140). Most strikingly, Frank Russell (1936, 540) writes of ‘an “anarchy of sovereignties”’.

Sometimes, though, anarchy is presented as the condition that exists in the absence of a system of sovereign states. (Sovereignty is here understood to involve mutual legal recognition and restraint that puts an end to anarchic lawlessness (Hill 1911, 140, 173; Walsh 1922, 123, 221; Herz 1959, 59–60.) For example, medieval (but not modern) international relations is described as anarchic (Walsh 1922, 57; Hodges 1931, 57 [sic]) – because there were no sovereign states. Some authors draw a similar distinction between the early and later modern periods (Lawrence 1898 [1895], 35; Follett 1920, 269; Potter 1922, 40, 457; 1929, xiii, 25; Potter and West 1927, 4; Hodges 1931, 48; Schuman 1933, 39; Fenwick 1934, 49, cf.; Russell 1936, 90; Earle et al. 1943, 33; Herz 1959, 43–44; Wright 1964 [1942], 180).

Finally, a disparate residual set of uses contrasts sharply with contemporary usage. For example, Quincy Wright argues that when defense predominates ‘international anarchy has sometimes resulted’ and that

---

4 See Appendix 4.A, available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000111.

5 See Appendix 4.B, available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000111.

6 ‘The only alternative to anarchy is government’ (Woolf 1916, 312). ‘The power which prevents anarchy in intra-group relations encourages anarchy in intergroup relations’ (Niebuhr 1932, 16). See also Lawrence 1898 [1895], 19; Hobson 1902, 174; Mackinder 1919, 6; Hicks 1920, 117; Mowat 1931, 13; Simonds and Emeny 1935, 138; Sharp and Kirk 1940, 397; Burton 1965, 45–46; Osgood and Tucker 1967, 13.

7 In addition to the works cited in the remainder of this paragraph, see Willoughby (1896, 196), Leacock (1906, 89, 95), Mahan (1912, 2), Woolf (1916, 125), Politis (1926, 6), Mitrany (1933, 165), Simonds and Emeny (1935, 28, 563), and Hinsley (1963, 326, 327). See also the sections Anarchy, states systems, and international relations and Words and concepts.
‘universal empire or anarchy has usually followed balance-of-power periods’ (1964 [1942], 63, 127, cf. Follett 1920, 307). Morton Kaplan argues that bipolar war leads to ‘a hierarchical international system if one side wins or international anarchy if both sides are exhausted. Almost any kind of system may replace this state of anarchy’ (1957, 49). Both Alfred Zimmern (1936, 40, 62) and F. H. Hinsley (1963, 220) contrast the rise of international conferences in the nineteenth century to the anarchy of the eighteenth century. Nationalism (Angell 1921, 98; Woolf 1940, 76), the will to power (Niebuhr 1932, 18), and ‘the backwardness of weak states’ (Lippmann 1915, 127, cf. 114) are presented as sources of anarchy. For Mary Parker Follett ‘anarchy means unorganized, unrelated difference’ (1920, 35, cf. 305). For Frederick Hicks ‘international anarchy ... implies absolute disrespect for law on the part of all states’ (1920, 7). Before 1979, such passages, rather than infrequent oddities, comprise a sizable portion of total uses that do not simply indicate disorder.

Earlier authors did, of course, address issues that today are considered matters of anarchy. It was uncommon, though, to view them through the lens (or as manifestations) of anarchy. Moreover, ‘anarchy,’ which had several meanings, rarely defined international relations or explained behavior in international systems in general.

Anarchy, states systems, and international relations

Six (7%) of my pre-1946 books do employ anarchy as a major explanatory variable: G. Lowes Dickinson’s The European Anarchy (1916) and The International Anarchy (1926), Frederick Schuman’s International Politics (1933), Philip Henry Kerr (Lord Lothian)’s Pacifism in Not Enough (1935), Nicholas Spykman’s America’s Strategy in World Politics (1942), and Edward Vose Gulick’s The Balance of Power (1943). (This set, fortuitously, includes two ‘idealists’ (Dickinson and Kerr), two ‘realists’ (Schuman and Spykman), and a pacifist (Gulick) who seems pulled in both directions.) Only one book, though, understands anarchy as the absence of government or a defining feature of international relations.


Dickinson’s explanations of state action are regularly embedded in a system of anarchy (1917 [1916], 14, 19, 26–27, 42, 71, 73, 80, 96–98, 127–29, 136–37). He insists, even in the midst of World War I, that although Germany...
bears considerable responsibility for the outbreak of fighting ‘the real culprit was the European anarchy’ (1917 [1916], 101, cf. 144; 1926, 325, 471). Most strikingly, Dickinson argues that ‘whenever and wherever the anarchy of armed states exists, war does become inevitable’ (1926, v).

His aim, however, is to analyze the ‘general situation’ that results from ‘the juxtaposition of a number of states, independent and armed. This was the condition of civilization in the three periods of European history that are most studied – ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, and modern Europe; and under that condition war is not an accident’ (Dickinson 1926, 3–4, emphasis added). Dickinson, in other words, addresses not international relations in general but states systems.

More particularly, Dickinson’s topic is ‘the European anarchy’ that produced World War I.\(^8\) His book by that name begins ‘in the great and tragic history of Europe there is a turning-point that marks ... the definite acceptance of international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of the sovereign State at the end of the fifteenth century’ (1917 [1916], 13). In the final sentence, he concludes that ‘the European anarchy is the real cause of European wars’ (1917 [1916], 144).

Furthermore, ‘the international anarchy’ for Dickinson includes much more than sovereign states interacting in the absence of overarching law and authority.

States armed, and therefore a menace to one another; policies ostensibly defensive but really just as much offensive; these policies pursued in the dark by a few men who, because they act secretly, cannot act honestly; and this whole complex playing upon primitive passions, arousable at any moment by appropriate appeals from a Press which has no object expect to make money out of the weakness of men – that is the real situation of the world under the conditions of international anarchy (Dickinson 1926, 47, cf. Dickinson 1920, 17, 34–36, 49–52, 63–81, 82).

‘The international anarchy’ identifies a particularly perverse, historically contingent form of power politics. ‘What was wrong? Germany? England? No. The European tradition and system’ (Dickinson 1917 [1916], 78).

This thick definition of anarchy also explains Dickinson’s (to our ears awkward) use of the definite article in both the titles and the text of his books. He addresses not international anarchy (in general) but the (very particular) ‘international anarchy’ of his time.

---

\(^8\) Even the apparently more general *The International Anarchy* is largely an expanded version of *The European Anarchy*. It is subtitled 1904–1914 and identifies ‘the special subject of this book’ as ‘the series of events and situations which led up to the Great War’ (Dickinson 1926, 3).
Schuman, Spykman, and Gulick also address systems of sovereign states – and the modern western states system in particular.

Schuman argues that ‘if anarchy involves the absence of government, the pursuit by each of his own ends, and the use of violence in the service of such ends, then the practice of international politics can indeed be described accurately as “international anarchy”’ (1933, 514). This passage, however, concludes a paragraph that addresses ‘Sovereign States’ interacting in ‘a State System’ (1933, 514).

For Schuman, state sovereignty, not anarchy, defines modern international relations. ‘The sovereignty of the territorial State remains in the twentieth century, as in the sixteenth, ... the most characteristic feature of the entire Western State System’ (1933, 53, cf. 502). ‘The concept of State sovereignty, the principles of international law, and the politics of the balance of power may be regarded as the three cornerstones upon which the Western State System has come to rest’ (1933, 49, cf. 52).

Furthermore, as these passages suggest, Schuman’s subject is not international relations in general but the Western state system. (The book’s subtitle is An Introduction to the Western State System.) He addresses ‘western civilization and the systems of international politics which that civilization has developed’ (1933, 536), aiming ‘to describe the Western State System realistically and objectively in terms of its cultural origins, its institutionalized forms, its dynamic forces, and its apparent prospects’ (1933, xiii, cf. 831).

In Spykman’s America’s Strategy in World Politics, a number of passages do sound strikingly similar to Waltz. ‘The international community is without government, without a central authority to preserve law and order’ (1942, 446, cf. xiii, 7, 18). ‘The so-called sovereign independence of states, the absence of higher authority, and the freedom from external restraints ... give to interstate relations their peculiar character of anarchy’ (1942, 16).

This last passage, however, continues ‘This historical state system consisting of sovereign independent units ...’ (Spykman 1942, 16). Spykman, like Schuman and Dickinson, sees anarchy as characteristic of a particular contingent configuration. ‘War is unpleasant, but it is an inherent part of state systems composed of sovereign independent units’ (Spykman 1942, 25).

Gulick similarly argues that international anarchy, understood as ‘the absence of any over-all authority,’ is the ‘central’ and ‘outstanding characteristic’ of ‘the system of sovereign, independent states’ (1943, 12, 34, 38). He addresses not international relations in general but ‘an anarchic system of sovereign, independent states’ (1943, 55). This type of international system is characterized by balance of power politics, which is the particular subject of Gulick’s book. ‘The ancient Chinese had a taste of
it, as well as early middle-eastern State-systems, the Greek City States, and others. Moreover, it has been consciously applied by European statesmen for the last four hundred or more years’ (Gulick 1943, 1, cf. 11–12, 14, 15). In the eras of Rome, Charlemagne, and the Holy Roman Empire, however, ‘the absence of a State-system meant the absence of the Balance of Power’ (Gulick 1943, 14).

Lord Lothian’s *Pacifism is Not Enough* is the one book in my pre-1946 sample that uses ‘anarchy’ very much like contemporary IR does. Lord Lothian speaks repeatedly of the ‘anarchy of sovereign states’ (Kerr 1935, 13, 16, 23) and the anarchy ‘inherent in state sovereignty’ (Kerr 1935, 14, 37, 47–48). Moreover, unlike most others in early IR, he neither understands sovereignty and states as juridical concepts nor considers states systems to be historically contingent constructions. By ‘state’ Lord Lothian means, roughly, polity and by ‘sovereignty’ statehood (Kerr 1935, 8ff.). Furthermore, like Waltz, he sees anarchy and government as binary terms that exhaust the range of political possibilities (Kerr 1935, 40–42).

Lord Lothian, however, in sharp contrast to contemporary IR, emphasizes the connection of anarchy with war, lawlessness, and disorder (Kerr 1935, 8, 10, 11, 18, 23, 24, 26, 34–35, 37–38, 41, 48–49). The term, in fact, seems chosen precisely for its negative connotations. For Lord Lothian anarchy arises from the absence of international government but means avertible violent disorder.

**The rise of a discourse of anarchy**

‘Anarchy,’ of course, did not spring, full-grown, from the head of Waltz in 1979. Important precursors in my sample include Martin Wight’s *Power Politics* (1946), Waltz’s *Man, the State and War* (1959), Herbert Butterfield and Wight’s edited volume *Diplomatic Investigations* (1966), and, at the very end of the period, Robert Jervis’ *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976) and Hedley Bull’s *The Anarchical Society* (1977).

These precursors point to the sources of contemporary IR’s discourse of anarchy: Waltz, social-scientific rationalism, and the English School. What follows tells (only) the American side of the story, partly for reasons of space but also because of the rapid embrace and continuing predominance of a particular discourse of anarchy in American IR.

Waltz’s role was decisive. *Man, the State, and War* laid the foundation for placing ‘anarchy’ at the heart of structural theory. His 1975 *Handbook* article which was well known at the time, outlined the argument of (and created considerable anticipation for) *Theory of International Politics* – the impact of which would be hard to overestimate.
Three elements seem to me to go a long way in explaining American IR’s embrace of Waltz. He endorsed a vision of social-scientific theory that was in the early stages of establishing its hegemony in the mainstream of the American discipline. (The first chapter of *Theory of International Politics* lays out his conception of theory. A later essay is pointedly titled ‘Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory’ (Waltz 1990).) Waltz aspired to general theory; theory of international politics (in general). Furthermore – and I think decisively – he employed anarchy at the heart of a seemingly elegant and powerful substantive theory (structural realism) that appeared to explain some important features of international systems (states in anarchy balance and pursue relative gains). That this theory breathed new life into realism and systems approaches probably was also significant.

Rational choice analysis more or less simultaneously picked up on anarchy, especially in the wake of Robert Axelrod’s work on the prisoner’s dilemma (1981, 1984, cf. Gowa 1986). The October 1985 Special Issue of *World Politics*, published in 1986 as *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Oye 1986), placed the fusion of anarchy and rationalism at the heart of the American discipline. It also can be seen to mark the adoption by neo-liberal institutionalism (the other leading substantive research program of the era) of the Waltzian account of the anarchic structure of international relations. The publication in 1986 of *Neorealism and Its Critics* (Keohane 1986) signaled a reorientation of American IR Theory around a Waltzian discourse of anarchy.

The spread of anarchy was also facilitated by the fact that Waltz presented it not as a substantive assumption of neorealism but as an analytically neutral demarcation criterion. ‘Anarchy’ quickly replaced ‘politics among nations’ as the defining feature of international relations – and was almost unthinkingly accepted as the structural ordering principle of international systems.

We can chart these changes in the spread of the language of ‘the effects of anarchy.’ A Google Scholar search for ‘effects of anarchy’ or ‘effects

---

9 Taylor (1976) was influential, explicitly linking anarchy to the question of cooperation (although not in an international context). Snyder and Diesing (1977) was an important early application of game theory to IR. (It is not included in my sample because I cannot find an electronic edition.) See also Young (1978).

10 Earlier ‘scientific’ IR, I would suggest, did not adopt anarchy because it is not operationalizable in any way that leads to substantively interesting conclusions. Moreover, if anarchy really is a feature of all international systems, it is correlated with any pattern that one finds in any set of international systems – making it an inappropriate explanatory variable for correlational methodologies. Only in a rationalist nomological-deductive conception of social science does anarchy become an attractive master explanatory variable.

11 For example, Keohane and Nye (1987, 745) explicitly adopt ‘the neorealist sense’ of structure. A decade earlier, though, in the book that this article updates (Keohane and Nye, 1977), they do not use ‘anarchy’ or ‘anarchic.’
of international anarchy’ and ‘international relations’ yields only three insignificant results from 1900 to 1974.12 There is one result for 1975–79: Jervis’s influential article ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’ (1978, 173).13 In the 1980s, ‘effects of (international) anarchy’ appears in seven works, including major articles by John Ruggie (1983, 284), Harrison Wagner (1983, 385), Michael Doyle (1983, 232), and Joseph Grieco (1988, 502).14 In the 1990s, however, there were almost 100 results; almost 250 in the 2000s; and more than 200 for 2010–15.

Many early constructivists, being focused on other issues, left Waltz’s anarchy-centric conception of international relations unchallenged even as they rejected his neorealist account of the effects of anarchy. For example, Friedrich Kratochwil, whose Rules, Norms, and Decisions was a major early constructivist work, limits his criticism to the idea that anarchy implies the absence of norms (1989, Ch. 2). Even Alexander Wendt’s classic 1992 article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It,’ while emphasizing the variety of types of anarchy, leaves anarchy’s central place untouched.15

By the mid-1990s, anarchy had become ‘naturalized’ across much of the discipline; treated as a taken-for-granted foundational assumption. Neorealism and neoliberalism, the leading research programs of the era, even incorporated anarchy into their ‘hard core’ that no contrary evidence or argument can be permitted to challenge (Elman and Elman 2003, x, 19, 25–27, 61–62, 73, 75, 80).16

Words and concepts

One might argue that I have focused on the word ‘anarchy’ but ignored ‘the concept.’ I am suspicious of the underlying account of the relationship

---

12 Two are works in IR: Duggan (1919, 27) (‘here and there some voice was raised against the almost intolerable effects of anarchy’) and Lijphart (1974, 52) (Woodrow Wilson ‘feared the effects of international anarchy even among democracies’). The third is in a history of the growth of the United States.

13 In addition, Jervis’ Perception and Misperception in International Politics is the first book that I can find by an American author other than Waltz that makes central use of ‘anarchy’ in the Waltzian sense (1976, 20, 62, 63, 67, 68, 75, 76, 83, 273, 340). In private correspondence, Jervis recalls first encountering anarchy through the teaching of Glenn Snyder at Berkeley (who was strongly influenced by Waltz, who had not yet moved to Berkeley).

14 The other references are in Murphy (1983), Snyder (1988), and a law review article on Grenada and Realpolitik.

15 There were, of course, exceptions. Ashley (1988) is perhaps the leading example. See also Onuf (1989, Ch. 5) and Walker (1993, 33–43, 63–74, 150–52, 172–76).

16 Andrew Moravcsik (2003, 190) goes so far as to argue that anarchy is part of the ‘hard core’ of ‘nearly all major IR theories.’
between words and concepts, which seems to suggest that anarchy is an ‘objective’ ‘thing’ ‘out there’ to which a variety of labels can be more or less arbitrarily attached. Nonetheless, this argument merits attention. (Readers convinced by the argument above, however, might want to skip to the subsection A discourse of sovereignty (not anarchy).)

**Searching (electronically) for the concept of anarchy**

We can begin with a modified version of the search strategy used above. In my pre-1979 books for which electronic full text is available, I searched for ‘absence’ and ‘government,’ separately (to capture references to lack of government that did not use the word ‘absence’). To avoid an overly narrow focus on the word ‘government,’ I also searched for ‘central authority’ and ‘higher authority.’ Based on my reading of early works that did refer to anarchy, I looked as well for ‘sovereign,’ ‘sovereignty,’ and ‘state.’ Finally, on hunches, I searched for ‘state of nature,’ ‘lawless,’ and ‘lawlessness.’

This procedure, for all its limitations, should reveal any substantial discourse of anarchy. The broad sweep of these searches, though, makes simple counts of little interest. I can thus report only my qualitative assessment of the relevant results.

In books that do not make significant use of ‘anarchy,’ searches for absence, government, and central or higher authority produced only scattered references with uses even close to those of contemporary IR (see, e.g., Lawrence 1898 [1895], 159; Leacock 1906, 103, 104). Conversely, books that do make significant reference to anarchy produced numerous hits (e.g., Spylkman 1942, 16, 18, 446; Gulick 1943, 6, 12; Wight 1978 [1946], 101, 105, 184; Waltz 1959, 5, 11, 35, 96, 188; Bull 1977, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 57, 59, 62, 69, 110, 125, 126, 129, 182). This strongly suggests that the concept of anarchy was not regularly referenced independent of the word.

Arguments for the necessity or possibility of international government were fairly common. This, however, is no more evidence of a discourse of

---

17 Cf. the section Anarchy as a constructed concept.

18 This includes only a little more than a third (52 of 145) of these books, two-thirds of which were published before 1923. (For the books in this subsample, see Appendix 4.C.) I cannot see, though, that any systematic bias is introduced. If anything, one would expect better-known books to be overrepresented. And I know of no argument that usage changed significantly anywhere between 1923 and 1978.

19 In addition to the passages in the following paragraph, see Trueblood (1899, 3, 125, 126, 130, 135, 137), Lippmann (1915, 129–30, 142–45, 185, 187), Hicks (1920, 117), and Kerr (1935).
anarchy than talk about the possibility or desirability of peace is a discourse of war. Such arguments treat anarchy not as defining international relations but as a contingent and alterable feature of some international systems. Moreover, they focus not on the absence of government but on the possibilities of establishing its presence.

Furthermore, several authors argue that twentieth century international relations is characterized by the presence of international government (Trueblood 1899, 138, 142; Hobson 1915; Lippmann 1915, 130–31, 145; Woolf 1916, 141–43, 149, 153–55, 267, 312; Smuts 1918; Potter 1922, 12–14, 23, 269, 369, 381; Mitrany 1933). As Schuman puts it, ‘the net result of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been the emergence and development of habits and institutions of cooperation between States to which it is now customary to apply the terms “international organization” or “international government”’ (1933, 231). A significant portion of the discipline – including realists like Schuman – denied the ‘fact’ of anarchy.20

The other searches likewise provided no significant evidence of a concept of anarchy expressed in other terms. (I was surprised to find almost no references to absence of a sovereign. Moreover, ‘state of nature,’ which is used with moderate frequency in discussions of origins and theories of the state, rarely has the sense that international anarchy does in contemporary IR.21) As it seems highly unlikely that other words were used but not my search terms, I conclude that anarchy was not an analytically central concept in pre-Waltzian IR.

An early political discourse of anarchy?

A critical examination of Schmidt’s The Political Discourse of Anarchy, a leading example of the argument of continuity, suggests the same conclusion. Schmidt insists that ‘the concept of anarchy employed in this book is not an externally or retrospectively imposed theme … but instead represents an indigenous construct around which discussions about the subject matter of international relations have continuously evolved’ (1998, 1–2, cf. 16). However, in the three principal chapters, which cover more than a hundred pages, Schmidt quotes only eight passages from authors other than Dickinson that employ the language of anarchy (1998, 94, 113, 172, 182, 186, 204, 208, 210). He thus must be implicitly advancing a concept-without-the-word argument.

Characteristic of Schmidt’s account are his claims that Stephen ‘Leacock articulated the theoretical limits of the concept of sovereignty for examining

20 See footnote 31 for a more precise formulation of this point.

21 Raymond Aron (2003 [1966], especially 339) is the principal exception.
the external relations of states and, in doing so, outlined one of the main props of the political discourse of anarchy’ and that Westel Woodbury Willoughby’s ‘reference to the international milieu as being analogous to a state of nature is a major component of the political discourse of anarchy’ (Schmidt 1998, 84, 90). As Schmidt’s further discussions indicate, though, Leacock and Willoughby actually address sovereignty, independence, authority, the state, and the state of nature – which have common meanings and uses entirely independent of anarchy. However, Schmidt presents no evidence that Leacock and Willoughby understood these notions in terms of anarchy. And, a look at their books indicates that they did not.22

Willoughby examines the nature of the state, addressing international relations only briefly, near the end of the book (1896, 404–06ff.).23 Moreover, his discussion does not even note the absence of international government (or any other marker of ‘anarchy’). Quite the contrary, Willoughby begins by claiming that ‘the most obvious fact is the increasing inter-nationality of interests that attends advancing civilization.’ He then goes on to argue that ‘the principles of international conduct that are generally accepted by all civilized peoples already constitute a very considerable body of procedure’ and ‘in many cases common administrative procedures have been established’ (1896, 404).

Leacock does devote a chapter to ‘Relation [sic] of States to One Another.’ It begins by noting that ‘theoretical isolation is the prime condition of [a state’s] existence as a state’ and that ‘viewed in a purely theoretical light, every state is an absolutely independent unit. Its sovereignty is unlimited, and it renders political obedience to no outside authority’ (Leacock 1906, 89). Immediately, though, Leacock goes on to argue that ‘it is nevertheless the case that in actual fact different states stand in close contact with one another in a variety of ways … [that] bring separate states into permanent relations demanding some sort of regulation’ and that ‘the action of modern states shows an increasing tendency to conform to a generally recognized usage’ (1906, 89). Moreover, Leacock presents Westphalia as putting an end to ‘the anarchy of the state of nature’ to which ‘the savagery of the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’ had reduced Europe (1906, 93).

For both Leacock and Willoughby the absence of an international government serves as a background condition that sets a context for

22 Each uses ‘anarchy’ or ‘anarchic’ six times, always to indicate disorder (except for two passages in Willoughby that reference anarchism) (Willoughby 1896, 71, 85, 90, 318, 320, 340; Leacock 1906, 93, 101, 112, 114–15, 289, 374).

23 The word ‘international’ appears less than 30 times in more than 400 pages, usually in reference to international law.
analyses that focus on the presence of international governance. A discourse of anarchy is Schmidt’s anachronistic imposition.

A discourse of sovereignty (not anarchy)

Schmidt does demonstrate that ‘the most important theme that structured the early study of political science can be termed the theoretical discourse of the state’ and that ‘of all the issues that the theoretical discourse of the state encompassed, none was more weighty than the concept of sovereignty’ (1998, 44, emphasis in orginal, 30). His further argument, though, that ‘since state sovereignty is the constitutive principle of international anarchy, the theoretical discourse of the state was also tacitly laying the groundwork for the political discourse of anarchy’ (1998, 45) both misrepresents early IR and elides important differences between anarchy and sovereignty.

As we saw above, several early scholars did closely associate sovereignty with anarchy (Hill 1911, 15, cf. 140; Fenwick 1934, 47). Others, though, saw sovereignty as ending anarchy, making ‘anarchic systems’ and ‘systems of sovereign states’ opposites. Both ancient (Walsh 1922, 57; Hodges 1931, 57 [sic]) and medieval (Potter 1922, 40, 457; 1929, xiii, 25; Potter and West 1927, 4; Hodges 1931, 48; Russell 1936, 90; Schuman 1933, 39; Wright 1964 [1942], 180; Herz 1959, 43–44, cf. Follett 1920, 269) international relations, in contrast to modern international relations, are presented as anarchic. T. J. Lawrence and Charles Fenwick, in addition to Leacock, see the Peace of Westphalia putting an end to (rather than codifying) anarchy (Lawrence 1898 [1895], 35; Fenwick 1934, 49, cf. Earle et al. 1943, 33). Wright sees the anarchy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries replaced by state sovereignty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (1964 [1942], 191–92). John Herz opposes sovereignty, which provides ‘agreed upon standards and rules,’ to ‘real “anarchy”’ (1959, 59–60). Schuman fears that ‘Fascist nationalism ... would return with a vengeance to the conditions of international anarchy’ (1933, 293) by eliminating the constraints and protections of sovereign statehood. Moreover, the substantial majority of my pre-1979 authors, it must be remembered, offer no evidence that they saw any analytically significant connection between anarchy and sovereignty.

24 Note that this is not the standard Waltzian understanding. (Absence of either international government or hierarchy has many sources in addition to the presence of state/national sovereignty.)

25 See footnote 9 and the section Anarchy, states systems, and international relations.
Schmidt replaces a particular account in terms of sovereignty – and in which there was no consensus on the relation between sovereignty and anarchy – with a general and discipline-wide account in terms of anarchy. However, as Schmidt (rightly) notes, ‘the concept of anarchy is more a function of internal disciplinary debate than a self-referential empirical fact of the external world’ (1998, 231). How we refer to ‘things’ like the absence of an international government – the terms of discourse – matter, sometimes decisively. And, the terms in early IR were sovereignty and the state, not anarchy.

Finally, to the extent that anarchy is a consequence of sovereignty, it is neither a defining feature of international relations nor of any real analytic significance. (Any ‘effects of anarchy’ are reducible to effects of sovereignty.) The discourse of sovereignty thus further explains the absence of an early discourse of anarchy.

**Part two: the false promise of anarchy**

So what? Disciplinary history may be interesting. Certainly, though, the crucial question is whether IR’s turn to anarchy has been analytically fruitful. I argue that it has not.

The transformation of American IR involved much more than introducing the word ‘anarchy’ to refer to the absence of an international government. Anarchy became a demarcation criterion, a master explanatory variable, and the structural ordering principle of international systems. Contemporary (American) IR claims that anarchy both identifies and structures international systems and explains some fundamental features of their functioning. The following three sections challenge these claims.

**Defining anarchy**

Most in IR today, I suspect, would agree with David Lake that ‘scholars of international relations do not differ in their conception of anarchy’ (2009, 2). This is suggested by the fact that in many (perhaps even most) uses, the term is not defined or glossed,26 its sense being taken to be obvious. In fact, however, there is deep definitional disarray, both in Waltz and in the discipline generally.

---

26 For example, of the 35 articles published in *International Organization* between 2000 and 2012 that use (international) ‘anarchy,’ only two (Snyder 2002, 7; Donnelly 2012, 620) define it explicitly. Similarly, only 1 of 29 articles in *International Security* between 2000 and 2012 (Taliaferro 2000–2001, 128) defines (international) ‘anarchy.’ More broadly, in August 2013 I searched Google Scholar for ‘anarchy’ and ‘international relations’ and then examined the first, eighth, and fifteenth sources on the first seven pages of results. 12 of the 21 works in this sample used ‘anarchy’ with no definition or explication of any sort.
Waltz, government, and hierarchy

Waltz, in the first paragraph of the subsection on ‘Ordering Principles’ in Chapter 5 (Political Structures) of *Theory of International Politics*, writes: ‘Domestic political structures have governmental institutions and offices as their concrete counterparts. International politics, in contrast, has been called “politics in the absence of government”’ (1979, 88). He then asks ‘if international politics is “politics in the absence of government,” what are we in the presence of?’ (1979, 89). The answer, of course, is anarchy.

In the remainder of the chapter, however, Waltz opposes anarchy not to government but to hierarchy (1979, 93, 97, 100, 101). Similarly, in Chapter 6 (Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power) he begins by speaking of ‘anarchy, or the absence of government’ and ‘the distinction between anarchy and government’ (1979, 102, 103). After that, though, Waltz contrasts anarchy to hierarchy nearly a dozen times (1979, 104, 113, 114 [twice], 115 [five times], 116 [twice]). Absence of government makes only one additional appearance (Waltz 1979, 114) – at the beginning of the subsection on ‘Anarchy and Hierarchy.’

The obvious problem – although a problem that is widely overlooked – is that hierarchy and government are very different things. (For example, government is only one possible source or form of hierarchy.) All international systems may lack government. Most, however, have hierarchy (e.g., Hobson and Sharman 2005; Donnelly 2006; 2009, 55–71; 2012, 622–23; Lake 2009; Hobson 2014), in the sense of a stratified system of differentiated social positions arranged ‘in relations of super – and subordination’ (Waltz 1979, 88). For example, great power states systems are defined by the formal hierarchical superiority of states over nonstate actors and the (at least informal) rights, liberties, and responsibilities of great powers.

Waltz was an extraordinarily careful writer, with a strong aspiration to (and a considerable reputation for) analytical rigor. The explanation for this systematic conceptual slippage, I want to suggest, is that it is required by the Waltzian project of theory of international politics.27

Waltz aimed to reveal ‘a small number of big and important things’ (1986, 329) about international systems. To do so on the basis of anarchy, anarchy must be both a demarcation criterion (allowing him to speak about international systems in general) and a major explanatory variable.

---

27 Without overstating the point, it seems to me important to highlight the systematic nature of this slippage. Waltz defines international relations in terms of absence of government. He explains international behavior, however, by absence of hierarchy. I am suggesting that this reflects neither conscious dissimulation nor accident but is an unintended consequence of a particular theoretical orientation and project, facilitated by the ambiguity of the word ‘anarchy.’
(allowing him to say some big and important things). Any particular definition, however, can fulfill (at most) one of these roles.

Anarchy plausibly demarcates international relations only if defined as absence of a government (or a comparable institution). This, however, has few if any interesting implications. (For example, a system without a government may or may not have higher authority, rules, or enforcement and may or may not generate self-help balancing and the pursuit of relative gains.) Conversely, although various other absences have analytical bite – for example, systems without hierarchy do have very particular characters – they comprise only a subset of international systems. Waltz seems to have been deceived by the word ‘anarchy’ into believing that he could have it both ways.

In criticizing other arguments, Waltz complains that ‘anarchy is taken to mean not just the absence of government but also the presence of disorder and chaos’ (1979, 114). He, however, takes anarchy to mean not just the absence of government but also as the absence of hierarchy. And by failing to appreciate that absence of government and absence of hierarchy identify very different sets of ‘anarchic’ systems, Waltz illegitimately extends substantive conclusions about systems without hierarchy, which are rare, to systems without government (i.e., international systems in general). This conceptual and analytical blunder, it seems to me, would be inconceivable were it not obscured by ‘anarchy.’

Waltz’s account, it is important to emphasize, is not an ‘ideal type’ in the Weberian sense of an analyst-created model that may (or may not) be more or less closely approximated in the world. Waltz claims not that some international systems resemble this model. (Anarchy thus understood would be a feature of a subset of international systems, not international systems in general – which Waltz insists is his referent.) He really does argue that, as a first approximation, (nearly all) international systems do lack not only government but also hierarchy.

This, however, is not even close to true – as Waltz himself acknowledges. ‘Inequality is what much of politics is about’ and ‘internationally, inequality is more nearly the whole of the political story’ (Waltz 1979, 142. 143). ‘The inequality of nations is ... the dominant political fact of international life’ (Waltz 1979, 144). I can think of no more striking example of the unfortunate impact of anarchy on contemporary IR. The core concept of the discipline has been constructed in such a way that it not merely ignores but denies the existence of what its leading proponent calls the dominant political fact of international life.

28 For example, although systems without hierarchy may be ‘horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, undirected, and mutually adaptive’ (Waltz 1979, 113) this is not true of (all) systems without a government (e.g., great power and hegemonic systems, cf. footnote 44).
Anarchy over ‘anarchy’

Waltz, however, is just the tip of the iceberg of conflicting definitions. Appendix 5, available online, identifies 20 definitions of anarchy, each documented by five citations (most from the past two decades).

Most of these definitions, which focus on the absence of various types and sources of authority, differ from many others only in minor ways. As a set, though, they cover a very wide range of senses. They fall into three broad groups that, with a bit of mnemonic license, I label absence of a ruler, absence of rule, and absence of rules.

Absence-of-a-ruler definitions identify an authoritative institution or actor that is missing in international systems. Standard examples are a central, higher, common, or overarching authority, an enforcer (of rules or agreements), and a sovereign. Absence of a government also falls here.

Absence-of-rule definitions identify a missing function or kind of authority. Common examples are enforcement and higher, overarching, central, common, superior, and superordinate authority.

Absence of an institution (a ruler), however, does not entail the absence of ‘rule;’ that is, the absence of either a function characteristically performed or a type of authority characteristically held by that institution. For example, government is but one possible source of any of these kinds of authority and only one mechanism to provide enforcement.

Finally, anarchy is also regularly defined as the absence of ‘rules;’ of authority simpliciter. For example, Lake claims that ‘the core assumption of the discipline of international relations is that the international system is anarchic or devoid of authority’ (Lake 2009, ix). Stephen Krasner contends that ‘the defining characteristic of international politics is anarchy, the absence of authority’ (1992, 48). Waltz’s absence of hierarchy also falls here.

---

29 See http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000111.
30 Citations for these senses – and those in the following paragraphs – are in Appendix 5, available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000111.
31 We can now more precisely formulate the claim above (at footnote 20) that early-twentieth-century international relations was characterized by international government rather than anarchy. There was government, understood as a function – governance, as we would say today – despite the absence of a single hierarchical governmental authority (a government). There was rule without a ruler.
33 This sense is also present in early IR where anarchy (understood as the absence of rules) is contrasted to sovereignty (which involves at least rules, and perhaps also rule, even in the absence of a ruler). See the second paragraph of the section ‘A discourse of sovereignty (not anarchy)’ (above).
These are not relatively minor differences of detail (on the level of, e.g., the fact that higher or superior authority need be neither supreme (or sovereign) nor centralized). Absence of an authority of a particular type (a ruler), absence of a particular type of authority (rule), and absence of all authority (rules) – like absence of government and absence of hierarchy – are fundamentally different notions. (Different concepts are expressed by the same word.)

Furthermore, as we move from a ruler to rule to rules, the scope of ‘anarchy’ constricts, dramatically. All international systems lack a government. Few, if any, lack (any/all) authority. Moreover, neither absence of rule nor absence of rules provides a plausible demarcation criterion.

This multiplicity of definitions seems to be driven by the desire, shared with Waltz, of using anarchy both to define the discipline and serve as a major explanatory variable – which is possible only by switching between absence of a ruler and absence of rule or rules. In any case, all of these definitions are standard in contemporary IR. The differences between them are regularly elided or ignored. And, it is distressingly common to generalize claims that rely (explicitly or implicitly) on the absence rule or rules to ‘international relations’ defined by the absence of a government.34 In addition, although this problem has been well known for decades35 it persists, largely unaddressed (as Appendix 5 illustrates). The ‘naturalization’ of anarchy – its unthinking acceptance as an obvious and essential feature of international relations36 – has allowed us to blithely ignore the confusion at the conceptual core of the discipline.

We should also note that this proliferation of definitions – in particular, adding the ‘thick’ senses of absence of rule and rules to the ‘thin’ sense of absence of a ruler – is substantively biased toward ‘realist’ accounts (which minimize the international significance of rule and rules). Moreover, despite protestations that disorder, lawlessness, and violence are not what ‘anarchy’ means in IR – if that is true, why don’t we just talk about the

34 See, for example, the passages in the third paragraph of the next section.

35 For example, Helen Milner’s classic article ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory’ gave considerable attention (1991, 71–74) to the difference between absence of government and absence of authority.

36 For example, an anonymous reader of an earlier draft wrote that ‘anarchy is understood by many as being a system in which states interact within a structure that is defined by rules and institutions that are weak in their behavioral effects.’ The logic would appear to be: international relations is anarchic; this is how international relations typically is structured; therefore, anarchy means this. However, of course, it does not (which is why almost all accounts say it means something else, even when this is the kind of international system intended to be referenced by anarchy).
absence of an international government, a much clearer and more precise notion? – these ordinary language connotations are almost inescapable. As Inis Claude puts it ‘anarchy is a symbol of peril – the peril of uncontrollable disorder’ (1962, 212).37

**Anarchy has no effects**

All of this might still be tolerable if anarchy in some sense(s) had more or less determinate effects in most international systems. In the 1980s it seemed that it did. Rationalist modeling, however, soon demonstrated that anarchy has no effects.38

Formal analysis revealed that rational actors in a world without government do not necessarily pursue relative gains – and that even those that do often rationally cooperate (e.g., Powell 1991, 1993; Snidal 1991a, b). Informally, Wendt (1992) showed that self-help balancing and the pursuit of relative gains are not effects of anarchy (absence of government) but of a particular type of international system that happens to be anarchic. By the mid-1990s it was clear, as Robert Powell (1994, 314) put it, that ‘what have often been taken to be the implications of anarchy do not really follow from the assumption of anarchy. Rather, these implications result from other implicit and unarticulated assumptions about the states’ strategic environment’.39

If anarchy means absence of a government – the only sense in which it applies across the whole of international relations – it simply is not true that ‘self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order’ (Waltz 1979, 111, cf. Mares 1988, 456; Walt 2002, 135; Copeland 2006 [2000], 9); that ‘little can be done to ameliorate the security dilemma as long as states operate in anarchy’ (Mearsheimer 2001, 36, cf. Schweller and Wohlfforth 2002, 72); or that ‘the systemic imperatives of anarchy require states to view their gains and losses in relative, not absolute, terms’ (Copeland 2003, 434–35). Such claims can be charitably dismissed as rhetorical exaggerations. It remains standard, though, to identify such ‘effects of anarchy’ but to acknowledge that outcomes may be altered by ‘intervening variables.’

37 These misleading connotations are further encouraged by analogies to the Hobbesian state of nature (which I criticize in the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the section Anarchy as a constructed concept).
38 The following paragraphs, for reasons of space, often assert (or cite to) claims that ought to be argued.
39 For a particularly spirited refrain, see Wagner (2007, 16–18, 21–29).
Anarchy, in this reading, pushes states in certain directions. The effects of anarchy are universal. Outcomes, however, vary depending on anarchy’s relative causal efficacy. As Waltz puts it, the predictions of a structural theory are ‘indeterminate,’ in the sense that ‘the outcome is indeterminate’ (1979, 124, 134).

Determinate effects can be deduced, though, only by adding something to the absence of a government. The purported ‘effects of anarchy’ thus actually are effects of (anarchy and) something else. And those effects vary, considerably, with the ‘something else’ in question. Similarly, if ‘anarchy’ means absence of rule or rules, that additional absence, not absence of a government (a ruler), does the explanatory work.

Anarchy understood as a general feature of international relations is not an independent variable with uniform effects (that may or may not be mitigated or overcome). It is an interactive and contextual variable associated with multiple equilibria. The effects of anarchy, not just its outcomes, vary—often dramatically.

The Waltzian project of employing anarchy as a master explanatory variable has failed. Anarchy provides no significant analytical payoff for the discipline as a whole. Therefore, there is no good reason to give a prominent place to a technical term of art that not only is readily subject to misunderstanding but is regularly and systematically used in shifting (and substantively biased) senses.

Anarchy and structure

Even Waltz’s critics usually accept that anarchy structures international systems. It does not.

Anarchy is not the ordering principle of international systems. Absence of an international government (or a comparable institution) is not an ordering principle. (It simply indicates one way in which the system is not ordered.) Absence of hierarchy may be an ordering principle. It is not, however, the ordering principle of international systems. (Most international systems

40 For example, simple immediate-return forager societies, composed of equal, functionally undifferentiated, and equally armed individuals and bands that confront each other in the absence of government and hierarchy, are warless societies that neither practice self-help balancing nor pursue relative gains but employ a security strategy that I call binding through sharing (Donnelly 2012, 610–16).

41 My argument, however, says nothing about structural realism (or any other substantive theory that employs a thick sense of anarchy or supplements absence of a government with other features) – as long as it is understood as a model or theory of a particular type of international system.
are hierarchical.) And the other absences noted above all run up against one or the other of these fatal problems.

The Waltzian account confuses demarcation and structure. Consider a biological analogy. Mammals can be demarcated from other vertebrates as milk-producing animals with hair, three bones in the middle ear, a neocortex, and a lower jaw made of a single bone. These features, however, do not define the structure of mammals. That A differs structurally from B by c does not make c the structure of A. Demarcation criteria and structural ‘ordering principles’ are very different things.

Equally problematic is the idea that all international systems have a single ordering principle; that they are all structured (arranged) in fundamentally the same way. This is no more true of international systems than national political systems, societies, or economies. Once we stop pretending that the absence of a government structures (arranges or orders rather than defines) international systems, their diverse structures become evident.42

Even the idea that each international system has a single ordering principle reflects little more than aesthetic prejudice. There was no single ordering principle in, for example, the Mediterranean system in the third and second centuries BCE or the European system of the thirteenth and fourteenth (or the sixteenth and early seventeenth) centuries – or in today’s globalizing world. Multidimensional, ‘hybrid,’ and sui generis systems are normal features of international relations.

Waltz, it seems to me, was right to try to specify a small number of elements that characteristically structure international systems. Anarchy, however, is woefully inadequate to that task.43

An anarchy-centric conception of structure focuses attention on something that tells us nothing about how international systems are structured. And in its Waltzian form, ‘anarchy’ denies the reality of vital features that actually do structure/arrange international systems. For example,

- Anarchy understood as the absence of hierarchy denies the existence of stratification, which in fact is central to the structure of most international systems.


43 In the Waltzian account, anarchy does almost all the work. For example, anarchy (alone) is held to explain self-help balancing, the pursuit of relative gains, and the security dilemma. It is thus surprisingly common to speak not only of the anarchic structure of international relations but of the ‘structure of anarchy’ (e.g., Keohane 1989, 132; Ruggie 1998, 143, 144, 152; Vasquez, 1998, 197, 211; Buzan and Waever 2003, 249; Little 2007, 175; Reus-Smit and Snidal 2009, 695). Cf. Waltz (1979, 116): ‘two, and only two, types of structures are need to cover societies of all sorts.’ A Google Scholar search in May 2015 for ‘structure of anarchy’ and ‘international relations’ produced more than 200 results since 2000.
Waltz claims that because international systems are anarchic they lack functional differentiation (1979, 97). In fact, however, states and nonstate actors have different functions, rights, and obligations in states systems. And Waltz himself devotes a chapter of *Theory of International Politics* to ‘The Management of International Affairs,’ addressing the ‘special responsibilities’ of great powers (1979, 198) and arguing that ‘neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can behave as “ordinary” states because that is not what they are’ (1979, 199).

Neither is it true that ‘in a system without central governance … there are no effective laws and institutions to direct and constrain’ actors (Waltz 1999, 698). Just as actors are ‘differently placed by their power and differences in placement help to explain both their behavior and their fates’ (Waltz 1990, 31), they are differently placed and shaped by their authority, status, and roles, by the rules that govern them, and by the institutions and practices in which they participate.44

The Waltzian construction of anarchy leaves us without a vocabulary or conceptual framework to even identify the ways in which any international system is actually arranged (structured) – let alone explore the ways in which the differing arrangements of the parts of different types of international systems have differing consequences for the character of international societies and the behavior of their members.

Waltz’s account of structure, we should note, cannot be defended as making admittedly inaccurate assumptions that provide predictive leverage. A structural explanation claims that a system is arranged in a certain way and that that arrangement explains the phenomena in question. Some simplification is, of course, necessary. Structural models, however, must be fundamentally accurate – or they are analogical or metaphorical, rather than explanatory in a stronger sense of that term. Moreover, the divergence between Waltzian anarchic international orders and the actual structure of international systems is so extreme that even an analogical argument is highly implausible.

**Conclusion: towards a post-Waltzian IR**

The arguments above, it seems to me, suggest not only the possibility but the desirability of a post-Waltzian IR in which anarchy is, at the very least, decentered. I introduce that suggestion, though, by stepping back to elucidate the claim that anarchy is a constructed concept. (In the available

---

44 All of these errors are rooted in falsely generalizing to systems without government features of systems without hierarchy.
space I can state (but not defend) my understanding, in order to clarify what would have to be debated in order to develop a ‘deeper’ argument for or against my account.)

**Anarchy as a constructed concept**

*All* concepts are constructed. About that there is little disagreement in contemporary philosophy of science. The central issue of genuine controversy, it seems to me, is the mix between analytical practices and the resistance of the world in shaping any particular concept.

To what extent is ‘anarchy’ imposed on us by the world? To what extent could we just as well construct IR and its subject matter in some (but not just any) other way(s)? Obviously, I see anarchy as a contingent construction – as illustrated by the fact that for two-thirds of the history of academic IR, realists and nonrealists alike successfully practiced their craft without central reference to anarchy.

But isn’t the absence of an international government a ‘fact’ that IR simply *must* comprehend? Let us grant that it is.45 ‘Anarchy,’ however, is only one of many possible ways – or, in contemporary IR, a fairly wide and disparate set of ways – to do that.

Consider, again, discourses of sovereignty and anarchy. They partially overlap. However, they differ fundamentally not only in reference and meaning46 but also in implication and connotation. For example, a discourse of sovereignty neither implies international disorder nor suggests the absence (or even the weakness) of international law, institutions, or authority. And where a discourse of sovereignty recognizes that the absence of international government takes different forms, anarchy, in its contemporary American conception, is a universal feature of international systems that largely specifies their structure (and tells us something of importance about their operation).

Or consider states systems, understood as a type of international society that prioritizes the autonomy of its members and thus radically decentralizes authority. States have many interests that can only be realized through cooperation. Horizontally generated rules and institutions thus are

---

45 This, however, is (by itself) not a compelling reason to grant it any analytic (as opposed to definitional) privilege.

46 For example, systems of sovereign states are ‘anarchic’ in the sense of lacking a government. But so are hegemonic systems, imperial systems, heterarchic systems involving multiple types of actors arranged in multiple ways (as in medieval Europe and many scenarios of globalization), and systems of autonomous polities that are not sovereign (as in Classical Greece or China during the Warring States period).
neither a puzzle to be explained nor a mechanism to mitigate the effects of
anarchy but an expected result of a particular type of distribution of
authority. Moreover, when rules and institutions develop beyond minimal
mechanisms of coexistence, the resulting governance structure is, at best,
misleadingly described as absence of international government.47

To take a final example, consider the (Hobbesian) ‘state of nature’ that
contemporary IR often associates with ‘anarchy.’ International systems
in fact rarely (if ever) resemble such a formless void. Almost all formally
privilege some actors (e.g., states in states systems). Inequalities of power
commonly create further qualitative differences (e.g., great powers).
And internal processes arrange actors as parts of a system (rather than
atoms in a void or mere elements of an aggregate).

Unfortunately, though, Lake seems correct when he suggests that ‘we
are drawn by our dominant theories to see the international system as an
anarchy, a state of nature’ (2009, 16). Most strikingly, Waltzian
anarchy, understood as absence of hierarchy, effectively amounts to such
a formless void.48

It simply is not true, though, that ‘authoritative rules within hierarchies
allow states to escape at least in part the anarchic state of nature in which
they would otherwise find themselves’ (Lake 2009, 101, emphasis added)
or that we should compare particular international arrangements and
institutions to ‘the anarchic state of nature they [states] would otherwise
inhabit’ (Lake 2009, 34, emphasis added, cf. 7, 9, 62, 93). Rarely if ever are
polities confronted with the need to escape from, or the possibility of falling
into, a state of nature. There is nothing ‘natural’ about the ‘state of nature.’
It is a particular (substantively biased) representation of the absence of
government.

‘Anarchy’ is not an analytically neutral ‘thing’ lying ‘out there,’ waiting
for us to bang our heads against or otherwise dis-cover and then come to
grips with. Rather than something ‘objective’ that can be conceptualized in
varying ways, it is a particular (and thus contentious) representation of
certain states of the world. As Waltz notes, ‘theoretical notions are
defined by the theory in which they appear’ (1979, 10). ‘Even descriptive
terms acquire different meanings as theories change’ (1979, 12).

47 Some readers may suggest that this account is very close to the English School vision of
anarchical international societies. I would note that this is how Schuman, Gulick, Wright, Herz,
and many others in pre-Waltzian IR understood the ‘facts’ that contemporary IR understands as
anarchic international orders.

48 ‘Most realists, including Waltz, use the term anarchy to mean not simply the absence of
hierarchical government but the presence of a Hobbesian state of nature’ (Vasquez 1993, 268).
Putting anarchy back into the background

The meanings given to anarchy in contemporary IR, I have argued, have impeded understanding the actual structure of real international systems. And nothing of substantive interest has been explained by the absence of an international government (alone). I thus propose that ‘anarchy’ be understood (1) to mean (only) absence of ‘a ruler’ (an authoritative governing institution or actor) and (2) to be (only) a demarcation criterion.

Thus understood, anarchy is a background condition. Absence of an international government poses problems. Nothing more. But nothing less either. The particular problems that anarchy poses limit the range of possible solutions. That range, though, is considerable.

Abandoning anarchy, however, does not suggest jumping on the hierarchy bandwagon. The denial of international hierarchy is indeed a particularly perverse consequence of the Waltzian construction of anarchy. Giving hierarchy its due place thus is an important remedial project. But hierarchy – pace John Hobson’s recent suggestion (2014) – is not IR’s core concept. Hierarchy is at least as characteristic of national as international systems. Moreover, the simple fact that international systems are hierarchic ought to be obvious and uninteresting to anyone who has not undergone professional training in academic IR.

In particular, hierarchy provides almost as poor an account of the structure of international (and national) systems as anarchy. It simply states that the pattern of stratification is not flat. It does not tell us how a system is

---

49 One might imagine that something of substantive interest about international relations in general must be explained by absence of an international government. I honestly, though, cannot think of anything.

50 I have chosen ‘dead end’ carefully. For example, the literature on ‘cooperation under anarchy,’ although often illuminating, is essentially a remedial effort to undo the damage caused by the idea of anarchy as an ordering principle with determinate effects. (Before Waltz, the fact that states cooperate was not thought to merit articles in major journals.) Moreover, if the frame of anarchy is fundamentally mistaken, as I have argued, then the substance (as opposed to the instigation) of the contributions of this literature has come despite (rather than as a result of) the turn to anarchy.

51 In the context of this essay, it is interesting to note that Waltz (1990, 36) claims that classical realists treat ‘anarchy [a]s a general condition rather than a distinct structure. Anarchy sets the problem that states have to cope with.’
stratified – or anything else about the (many and varied) ways in which international systems are structured.

A focus on hierarchy, like a focus on anarchy, gives in to the siren song of simple universal patterns; of general, transhistorical ‘theory of international politics.’ Even Economics, though, does not claim to have something of substantive interest to say about all economies at all times. We need more modest – and more realistic – expectations of international theory in general and structural theory in particular.

We need an IR that strives to comprehend, in methodologically and theoretically pluralistic ways, the complexity and diversity of international systems; an IR that neither minimizes nor obscures the careful analysis of the varied and typically complex structures of international systems. If we must use the language of anarchy and hierarchy, our focus should be on the considerable variety of types of hierarchies and anarchies, rather than the ‘facts’ – the simple existence – of anarchy and hierarchy.

The absence of an international government (anarchy) certainly is significant to the character and conduct of international relations. It is not, however, analytically central. Anarchy neither is a structural ordering principle nor has determinate effects. It is best understood, I have argued, as a background condition that differentially constrains and enables the security strategies and policy choices of international actors. As such, we ought to put anarchy back into the background of IR – where it was before Waltz.

Acknowledgements

I thank Raslan Ibrahim and Robert Jervis for their comments on earlier drafts. I also thank the anonymous reviewers and editors of International Theory for three rounds of extremely helpful criticisms and suggestions.

Supplementary material

For Appendices 1–5, please visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000111.

52 A less systematic survey of the books in my sample has convinced me that ‘hierarchy’ was also absent from pre-Waltzian IR. Both sides of the anarchy-hierarchy binary are Waltz’s construction. (He indicates no sources, precursors, or inspirations – and I have been able to find none.) Moreover, each, I am suggesting, has similar analytical shortcomings (because they are mutually co-constituting opposites).

53 Donnelly (2012, 622–28) sketches one such account. There are, however, many other potentially productive paths forward.

54 Escaping the anarchy-hierarchy binary would also allow us to treat structural change as no less a theoretical possibility than continuity. (Both anarchy and hierarchy, in the Waltzian construction, are constant, not variable.)
References

Sources with authors printed in small caps indicate books in Appendix 1, 2, or 3. Numbers in square brackets at the end of the entry indicate the occurrences of ‘anarchy’ or ‘anarchic.’


## Appendix 1:

### “Anarchy” in Early IR (1895-1945)

Occurrences of “anarchy” and “anarchic” in selected books published between 1895 and 1945. All electronically available passages are quoted from books with less than twenty occurrences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
<th>(Mean: 7.3, Median: 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T. J. Lawrence (1895), The Principles of International Law.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>“The Majestas Populi Romani … stood between the world and anarchy, it protected civilization from barbarism;” (31) after the Thirty Years’ War, “weary of anarchy, Europe eagerly adopted a system” that curbed warriors and statesmen; (35) without obedience to legitimate domestic authorities “there is anarchy;” (56) “a condition of revolution or anarchy” without legitimate authority; (60) “confusion and anarchy.” (205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westel Woodbury Willoughby (1896), An Examination of the Nature of the State: A Study in Political Philosophy.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hobbes holds that “to resist the sovereign is to return to a state of anarchy;” (71) Hobbes holds that “a change in Government necessitates a dissolution of political society and a return to anarchy;” (85) Hobbes “pictures the non-political state as one of anarchy;” (90) [re: anarchism]; (318) [re: anarchism]; (320) “the fourteenth century anarchy in Scotland.” (340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bassett Moore (1898), History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States Has Been a Party.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>“All was anarchy and disorder;” (II,1503) “during the long period of anarchy in the Argentine Republic which followed the war with Brazil;” (II,1975) “the anarchy in Mexico of which Europe complains.” (III, 2929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Franklin Trueblood (1899), The Federation of the World.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>With the creation of a world state, “international chaos and anarchy, as they now so deplorably exist, will have passed away.” (145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul S. Reinsch (1900), World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century. As Influenced by the Oriental Situation.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>“The ideal of the period is as far removed from the dead uniformity of a world empire on the one hand, as it is on the other from the distracting anarchy of a regime of mere local custom.” (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. A. Hobson (1902), Imperialism: A Study.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“the rise of anarchic cosmopolitanism from individual units amid the decadence of national life;” (9) “substituting government for anarchy among nations.” (174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Leacock (1906), Elements of Political Science.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>modernity “reduce[d] the monarchies of Europe to the anarchy of the state of nature;” (93) “imperfect political organization or chronic anarchy;” (101) [re: France] “the turbulent anarchy into which this democratic regime degenerated (1793-1799);” (112) “the suppression of anarchic disorder by the establishment of a military autocracy;” (114-115) [re: Philippine self-rule] “the wrangling anarchy of their half-civilized inhabitants;” (289) “the economic anarchy of free competition.” (374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William I. Hull (1908), The Two Hague Conferences and their Contributions to International Law.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>[quoting the fear that failure to compete in an arms race will lead to] “famine, social anarchy, incalculable chaos.” (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Angell (1910), The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>“The Condition of International Anarchy;” (vii, 15) “polite anarchy … juristically speaking, there exists a condition of anarchy;” (15) “dismembered Italy, the victim of discord and anarchy;” (18) “perpetual anarchy in the realm of international relations;” (22) mankind’s “inherent predisposition to disorder and anarchy;” (26) “law against anarchy;” (66) in “modern constitutional States … absolutism as well as anarchy has been held in check;” (137) “the persistent or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Samuel Reinsch (1911),</td>
<td>Public International Unions: Their Work and Organization, a Study in International Administrative Law.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Murray Butler (1912),</td>
<td>The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. T. Mahan (1912),</td>
<td>Armaments and Arbitration or the Place of Force in the International Relations of States.</td>
<td>1 [re: Morocco] “the barbarous anarchy and mutiny which has been their lot for centuries past.” (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Angell (1914),</td>
<td>Arms and Industry: A Study of the Foundations of International Polity.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Noel Brailsford (1918 [1914]),</td>
<td>The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace</td>
<td>1 “resisting anarchy and fighting against an agitation that would be ‘the end of all things.’” (158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. A. Hobson (1915),</td>
<td>Towards International Government.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Lippman (1915),</td>
<td>The Stakes of Diplomacy.</td>
<td>4 “The anarchy of Europe is due to the anarchy of the Balkans, Africa, and Asia” due to the struggle to exploit these areas; (114) “the anarchy of the world is due to the backwardness of weak states;” (127) “hurid accounts of anarchy;” (151) “the anarchy in the country” furnishes a pretext for intervention; (152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Lowes Dickinson (1917 [1916]),</td>
<td>The European Anarchy.</td>
<td>100+‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. J. Grant et al. (1916),</td>
<td>An Introduction to the Study of International Relations</td>
<td>11 “we are just now more impressed by the dangers of national anarchy than by the charms of national independence;” (12-13) “the absence of pure anarchy implies the presence of laws, whether or not there be a definite sovereign to command and enforce;” (120) “native anarchy;” (152, 156) “the internal condition of India was approaching anarchy;” (153) “anarchy and disorder set in;” (160) “nothing save anarchy and the disappearance of any real prospect of the internal restoration of that law and order which are the conditions of liberty and progress, can warrant any other people taking charge;” (165) “the conquest of Nature and the suppression of anarchy;” (183) “Order reigns where otherwise anarchy might prevail;” (184) “chaos amongst the States of the world, potential disorder instead of established order, anarchy instead of law;” (187) “anarchy and impotence.” (198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Woolf (1916),</td>
<td>International Government: Two Reports.</td>
<td>1 “Wherever the relations within a community become many and complicated, the only alternative to anarchy is government, or the organized regulation of those relations.” (312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan C. Smuts (1918),</td>
<td>The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion.</td>
<td>2 “national individualism or anarchy;” (8) [quoting Browning] “that sad, obscure, anarchic state.” (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. P. Heatley (1919),</td>
<td>Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. J. Lawrence (1919),</td>
<td>The Society of Nations: Its Past, Present, and Possible Future.</td>
<td>2 “save the world from moral anarchy;” (17) “primitive conditions of chaotic disorder and almost unbridled anarchy.” (143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author and Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. J. Mackinder (1919)</td>
<td><em>Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Lowes Dickinson (1920)</td>
<td><em>Causes of International War.</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. P. Follett (1920)</td>
<td><em>The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government.</em></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Charles Hicks (1920)</td>
<td><em>The &quot;New World Order&quot;; International Organization, International Law, International Cooperation.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Maynard Keynes (1920)</td>
<td><em>The Economic Consequences of the Peace.</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Angell (1921)</td>
<td><em>The Fruits of Victory: A Sequel to &quot;The Great Illusion&quot;.</em></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaiah Bowman (1921)</td>
<td><em>The New World: Problems in Political Geography.</em></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Joseph Laski (1921)</td>
<td><em>The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays.</em></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bryce (1922)</td>
<td><em>International Relations.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert A. Gibbons (1922)</td>
<td><em>An Introduction to World Politics.</em></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“anarchy in that part of Morocco;” (214) “massacres and a state of anarchy;” (246) “lapse into anarchy;” (270) “a state of anarchy developed in Mexico;” (350) “the resultant anarchy.” (479)

J. A. Hobson (1922), Problems of a New World Order. 4 “revolting cruelty, appalling anarchy, and impending collapse charged against the Bolshevik administration;” (67) “the panic cries of confiscation, anarchy, and Bolshevism;” (199) “starvation, pestilence, and anarchy;” (228) “fissures within each separate self, carrying the process towards anarchy.” (252)

Pitman B. Potter (1922), An Introduction to the Study of International Organization. 13 a cosmopolitan world state “would tend toward anarchy, because of its emphasis upon the individual, and because of the elimination of intermediate authorities;” (14) “the disruption of the Roman empire, the anarchy of the fourteenth century, the catastrophe of 1914;” (19) the division of the Roman empire in 395 AD gave way to “still greater anarchy;” (32) [re: early feudalism] “The result was anarchy. Power was hideously decentralized” [with no nations and no sovereignty]; (40) [re: Frederick II] “while he was still in Palestine anarchy and rebellion broke out afresh in Lombardy and Sicily;” (47) [by 1555] “the Empire had already fallen into anarchy;” (306) [in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries] “Germany was in a state of anarchy;” (396) “to the members of the Holy Alliance it [France] appeared to be a force of anarchy pure and simple;” (419) “a condition of international anarchy” in which the consent of the parties to a conflict is required for international action; (440) “the present anarchy” contrasted to proposed international federation; (441) “the late-surviving Medieval anarchy was in a measure replaced by German unity;” (457) “the disorders of anarchy” [quoting an 1827 document]; (583) [bibliography entry for Dickinson, The European Anarchy]. (633)

Edmund A. Walsh, ed. (1922), The History and Nature of International Relations. 4 “the balance of power of the fourth century B.C. was more like a state of political anarchy than an order by system of independent states – an anarchy which considerably weakened Greece as a whole;” (57) “the dissolution of monarchy presents not other alternative than anarchy or self-government;” (88) without rights and obligations “we would live in a state of anarchy;” (123) “a state of confusion and anarchy;” (221)

Alfred E. Zimmern (1922), Europe in Convalescence. 2 “all possibility of emerging from the abnormal conditions of the blockade without widespread confusion and anarchy;” (22) postwar reconstruction was “a question of government against anarchy.” (80)


William Edward Hall (1924), A Treatise on International Law (8th ed.) 4 “rules of conduct which should command obedience apart from an external sanction were the necessary alternative to a state of complete anarchy;” (18) “social anarchy or local disruption;” (21) “the continuance of anarchy so prolonged as to render reconstitution [of the state] improbable;” (21) “It cannot avoid international responsibility on the plea of a deliberate preference for anarchy.” (272)

Raymond Leslie Buell (1925), International Relations 2 “would inaugurate international anarchy;” (46) “made secure against discord and anarchy.” (306)

Parker T. Moon (1925), Syllabus on International Relations. 1 a system of national enforcement of international law is “sometimes described as ‘international anarchy;’” (233)

G. Lowes Dickinson (1926), The International Anarchy, 1904-1914. 100+ “anarchy and mistrule;” (395) “in a word, more anarchy.” (536)

Parker T. Moon (1926), Imperialism and World Politics. 2 World War I showed “that in order to put a stop to international anarchy it is indispensable that States should submit of their own accord to legal discipline;” (6) “the dogma of sovereignty … [is] void of sense, and dangerous, because it tends to promote international anarchy;” (6) “the rule of unanimity may lead to paralysis and anarchy.” (10)

Nicolas Politis (1926), New Aspects of International Law 3 “the whole of society was bound to founder in anarchy;” (62) “man, master, and consumer have been held to be an anarchic trinity in perpetual conflict with one another.” (77)

Francis Delaisi (1927), Political Myths and Economic Realities 2 “order and justice … in place of … international anarchy.” (76)

Philip Noel-Baker (1928), The League of Nations at Work. 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. B. Mowat (1929),</td>
<td><em>The European States System: A Study in International Relations.</em></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>collapse of medieval system “throw back the States of Europe, not internally, but externally, into a condition of anarchy among themselves;” (8) “Machiavelli stepped in with principles which for the time being only increased the international anarchy;” (8) “throughout the sixteenth century the international anarchy was accentuated by the religious conflicts that arose;” (9) Poland’s “anarchic constitution.” (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitman B. Potter (1929),</td>
<td><em>This World of Nations: Foundations, Institutions, Practices.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“Medieval international anarchy;” (xiii) during the Middle Ages “the world of nations was still in a condition for which the term anarchy is hardly too strong;” (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James T. Shotwell (1929),</td>
<td><em>War as an Instrument of National Policy and Its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris</em></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>“the anarchy of war;” (12) Dante argued that “a superior power should coerce the anarchic and warring elements of civilization into a single empire;” (33) “an act of anarchy;” (100) “Mexico when it was in a state of anarchy;” (101) “anarchy at sea.” (238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Elmer Barnes (1930),</td>
<td><em>World Politics and Modern Civilization: The Contributions of Nationalism, Capitalism, Imperialism and Militarism to Human Culture and International Anarchy.</em></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>“the earlier portions … are designed to show how the world drifted into chaos and anarchy; the concluding parts will consider what prospects we have of escaping from this condition of armed anarchy, suspicion, and hatred” (5) “the whole complex of factors which led to what Professor G. Lowes Dickinson has well described as ‘the international anarchy’ which prevailed throughout Europe in 1914; (307) quotes from Dickinson (332, 349, 502, 504) Chapter XVI: How the United States Became Involved in the International Anarchy; (352) index entries for “international anarchy.” (xii, xiii, xiv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaiah Bowman (1930),</td>
<td><em>International Relations</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>“as the anarchy of nations gives way to conceptions of a community of interest;” (28) [bibliography entry for Dickinson, <em>The International Anarchy.</em>] (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quincy Wright (1930),</td>
<td><em>Research in International Relations Since the War.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“the trend from international anarchy toward public order;” (viii) “the welter of feudal anarchy;” (48) ancient international relations “was an era of international anarchy;” (57) “these empires of business are substituting order for anarchy.” (367)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Hodges (1931),</td>
<td><em>The Background of International Relations: Our World Horizons, National and International</em></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>“the trend from international anarchy toward public order;” (viii) “the welter of feudal anarchy;” (48) ancient international relations “was an era of international anarchy;” (57) “these empires of business are substituting order for anarchy.” (367)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. B. Mowat (1931),</td>
<td><em>International Relations.</em></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>“the appalling anarchy and disorder of the Dark Ages;” (7) with the modern state “Within states there was a rule of law. Between states there was international anarchy;” (15) “The Reformation broke up the unity of Christendom. The rise of nation-state based on the dogma of absolute state sovereignty completed the international anarchy;” (73) absolute sovereignty “is, from the international point of view, sheer anarchy;” (169) “tariff anarchy.” (172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. A. W. Manning (1932),</td>
<td><em>The Policies of the British Dominions in the League of Nations.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>“as the Europe has not been reduced to anarchy;” (113) “the nation which has fallen into anarchy.” (122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsay Muir (1932),</td>
<td><em>The Interdependent World and Its Problems.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“the power which prevents anarchy in intra-group relations encourages anarchy in intergroup relations;” (16) “the will-to-power of competing national groups is the cause of the international anarchy;” (18) power may “prevent anarchy by effective imperialism;” (19) “the Scylla of despotism and the Charybdis of anarchy;” (21) “the social anarchy and political irresponsibility which the theory [of laissez faire] sanctions;” (33) footnotes to Dickinson, <em>The International Anarchy,</em> (90, 93) “the anarchy of national tariffs;” (111) privileged groups “will feign to fear anarchy as the consequence of political action for social justice;” (129) “accusing them of [sowing domestic] anarchy;” (134) “the peril of [domestic] anarchy and revolution;” (135) “anarchy and revolution;” (136) “the fear of anarchy of American privileged groups;” (137) “even when no anarchy is threatened and no violence is used by the [lower] classes;” (138) “every form of violence and anarchy;” (139) attitudes vary depending on whether one has “suffered from either anarchy or autocracy.” (175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinhold Niebuhr (1932),</td>
<td><em>Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics.</em></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>“the power which prevents anarchy in intra-group relations encourages anarchy in intergroup relations;” (16) “the will-to-power of competing national groups is the cause of the international anarchy;” (18) power may “prevent anarchy by effective imperialism;” (19) “the Scylla of despotism and the Charybdis of anarchy;” (21) “the social anarchy and political irresponsibility which the theory [of laissez faire] sanctions;” (33) [footnote to Dickinson, <em>The International Anarchy,</em> (90, 93) “the anarchy of national tariffs;” (111) privileged groups “will feign to fear anarchy as the consequence of political action for social justice;” (129) “accusing them of [sowing domestic] anarchy;” (134) “the peril of [domestic] anarchy and revolution;” (135) “anarchy and revolution;” (136) “the fear of anarchy of American privileged groups;” (137) “even when no anarchy is threatened and no violence is used by the [lower] classes;” (138) “every form of violence and anarchy;” (139) attitudes vary depending on whether one has “suffered from either anarchy or autocracy.” (175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Lauterpacht (1933),</td>
<td><em>The Function of Law in the International Community.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“any society which has arisen above anarchy;” (393) “anarchy and private force.” (438)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| David Mitrany (1933),                       | *The Progress of International Government.*                           | 7    | after the collapse of Rome “it was a state of anarchy without order or principle, for individuals as for communities;” (23) “what Jellinek has called an ‘anarchic law’;” (64-65) “empires could collapse in one continent, or anarchy could disrupt it, without this being felt or even known” elsewhere; (115) functional integration offers “the most hopeful way out of
international anarchy;” (137) “the spread of supposed anarchy in Europe” caused by the French Revolution; (153) “the transition from anarchy to law;” (155) “the rise of the doctrine of state sovereignty and of the attendant anarchic individualism in international relations” (165).

Frederick Lewis Schuman (1933), *International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System.* 16 “[the medieval] system reduced central authority to impotence and fostered chronic anarchy and neighborhood warfare;” (39) “[re: sovereignty]” If carried to its logical extreme, it would result in a situation which can only be described as international anarchy;” (52) “after collapse of the medieval order “this anarchic jungle of sovereign political communities … was a pre-civil state of nature as Hobbes has described it;” (53) “Fascist nationalism … would return with a vengeance to the conditions of international anarchy;” (293) “if anarchy involves the absence of government, the pursuit by each of his own ends, and the use of violence in the service of such ends, then the practice of international politics can indeed be described accurately as ‘international anarchy’;” (514) if the West sticks to a system of nationalism, it risks “descending from a high plane of civilized life to a state of anarchic barbarism comparable to that prevailing in Europe during the ‘dark ages;’” (536) “the Western states system can be described as “international anarchy” and the global economy as “economic anarchy” although “the resulting pattern … is not quite anarchy in either case;” (539) “it seems doubtful to many whether there is any alternative to complete foreign domination or anarchy;” (635) “International anarchy, 514, 539;” (913) “sovereignty, and international anarchy, 52-53.” (919)

L. L. Bernard and Jessee Bernard (1934), *Sociology and the Study of International Relations.* 0

Charles G. Fenwick (1934), *International Law.* 12 “revolt and anarchy;” (16) “bring order out of economic anarchy;” (39) “sovereignty was a doctrine of legal anarchy;” (47) “the anarchy of the century preceding the Treaty of Westphalia;” (49) “the political anarchy in the Danubian region;” (333) “anarchy is not an unfamiliar detail in various Latin American areas;” (336) “China has today become a vast area of political anarchy;” (381) “Chinese internal anarchy;” (383) early twentieth-century “descent of Europe into new political anarchy;” (386) “Chinese anarchy;” (410) “the will of the majority must prevail or the condition of international anarchy … was bound to reappear;” (452) “the machinery for creating collective order in the place of the anarchy of the individualism of the past;” (550) “the rights of nations, everywhere reckoned imprescriptible, which are responsible for the present condition of anarchy.” (563)

Edith E. Ware (1934), *The Study of International Relations in the United States.* 1 “even anarchy – and the national states system was anarchical.” (6)

Harold D. Lasswell (1935), *World Politics and Personal Insecurity.* 0

Lord Lothian (1935), *Pacifism is Not Enough, Nor Patriotism Either.* 26 [quoting R. G. Hawtrey] “that perfect independence and that formal equality of sovereign authorities, which are in reality the foundations of the international anarchy;” (28) “the international anarchy which existed in the prewar era and has continued throughout the postwar period;” (127) “Europe had existed in a condition of anarchy, because there was lacking any established system of public international law and any form of central authority. In practice, however, this state of anarchy has been measurably mitigated by the gradual evolution of … the balance of power … [and] the Concert of Europe;” (138) after 1871 “a quarter century of Continental anarchy followed;” (147) “the political anarchy in the Danubian region;” (333) “anarchy is an unfamiliar detail in various Latin American areas;” (336) “China has today become a vast area of political anarchy;” (381) “Chinese internal anarchy;” (383) early twentieth-century “descent of Europe into new political anarchy;” (386) “Chinese anarchy;” (410) “the will of the majority must prevail or the condition of international anarchy … was bound to reappear;” (462) “the machinery for creating collective order in the place of the anarchy of the individualism of the past;” (550) “the rights of nations, everywhere reckoned imprescriptible, which are responsible for the present condition of anarchy.” (563)

Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny (1935), *The Great Powers in World Politics: International Relations and Economic Nationalism.* 14 “Mencius greatly deplored the prevailing anarchy and confusion;” (20) in the Dark Ages “law gave way to lawlessness and government to anarchy;” (90) “On account of his egoistic, unsociable, and acquisitive nature his condition was one of anarchy;” (198) World War I arose in part from “the international anarchy which they inherited and which they did nothing to abate;” (325) “the precarious freedom that is necessarily associated with an ‘anarchy of sovereignties’.” (540)

Frank M. Russell (1936), *Theories of International Relations.* 14

Alfred Zimmern (1936), *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935.* 2 international conferences “refute the assertion … that the nineteenth century was a period of ‘international anarchy’;” (40) “the eighteenth, rather than the nineteenth, century was ‘an age of international anarchy’ … the age of interstate
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author and Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Sherwood Dunn (1937), <em>Peaceful Change: A Study of International Procedures.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. A. W. Manning (ed.) (1937), <em>Peaceful Change: An International Problem.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. H. Bailey (1938), <em>International Studies in Modern Education.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Joachim Friedrich (1938), <em>Foreign Policy in the Making: The Search for a New Balance of Power.</em></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador de Madariaga (1938), <em>The World's Design</em></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Hallett Carr (1964 [1939]), <em>The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertram Maxwell (1939), <em>International Relations.</em></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derwent Whittlesey (1939), <em>The Earth and the State: A Study of Political Geography.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Davies (1940), <em>A Federated Europe.</em></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick A. Middlebush and Chesney Hill (1940),</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- Libertinism *par excellence.* (62)
- "the forces of disruption and anarchy;" (196) "such a balance between two hostile camps is not a balance, but … the prelude to international anarchy;" (220) "Mussolini was allowed to go ahead and wreck the League and international order. The anarchy was on;" (232) "progress toward war and international anarchy;" (234) "international anarchy based on brute force;" (273) "spread of international anarchy throughout the world;" (276) "international order as opposed to international anarchy;" (283)
- Germany, Italy, and Japan "deny world order and claim freedom of anarchical behavior;" (25) whether affairs "are going to be allowed to go on drifting in international anarchy or whether they are going to be managed by some systems and under some order;" (47) "the undisciplined forces of world anarchy;" (55) international law attempts "to put a minimum of order into the anarchy prevailing amongst the nations of the world;" (116) interwar period "may be seen in future centuries as the last gasp of world anarchy on the eve of world consciousness;" (123) war "over-reaches itself and leads to nationalism, absolutism and international anarchy through an exaggerated sense of sovereignty;" (128) "the permanent state of war, or, in other words, international anarchy;" (198) "world revolution … must be discussion amongst would-be remedies for world anarchy;" (200) "while insisting on the unruly ways of capitalists as one of the worst features of our world of anarchy;" (202) absolute free trade would be "a system which is not a system at all, but sheer anarchy;" (204) [index entry] "anarchy, 123, 128." (283)
- The belief that "reason could demonstrate the absurdity of the international anarchy;" (26) "this tendency [towards utopianism] is greatest at the period when anarchy is most prevalent in the practice of nations." (174)
- men "will continue to fight until some kind of order displaces the existing international anarchy;" (198) "the prewar world was constantly in danger of disastrous armed conflict. There was international anarchy." (217) "unemployment, starvation, anarchy, war, disease and despair." (225)
- federalism offers "an escape from the existing system of anarchy and oppression;" (15) [quoting Sophocles] "There is no greater evil than anarchy;" (15) federalism the alternative to "the tortuous by-paths of anarchy leading to war and impoverishment;" (25) "only anarchy would result if the self-determining units were free to impose their self-determined policies upon their neighbours;" (33) the League "was a case of 'legalising anarchy and calling it a constitution;" (34) "the rule of law will be substituted for the existing conditions of anarchy, when each State is a law unto itself;" (64) Europe is "a community of peoples who, living in a perpetual state of anarchy, are compelled by the crimes and follies of their rulers to slaughter each other at frequent intervals;" (78-79) "the price they now pay for a system of anarchy;" (114) "we cannot afford any longer to indulge in anarchy;" (126) "the perpetuation of anarchy and the preservation of these powers in the hands of the rulers;" (138) "the present system of anarchy;" (139) "the existing system of lawlessness and anarchy." (140)
- feudalism "a substitute for total anarchy;" (14) "chaos and anarchy which reigned during much of the feudal period;" (15) "anarchy, which by definition is lack of authority and obedience;" (41) nationalism "served to divert the masses from
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walter R. Sharp and Grayson L. Kirk (1940), <em>Contemporary International Politics.</em></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold Wolfers (1940), <em>Britain and France between Two Wars.</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Woolf (1940), <em>The War for Peace.</em></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Lothian (1941), <em>The American Speeches of Lord Lothian.</em></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linden A. Mander (1941), <em>Foundations of Modern World Society.</em></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas J. Spykman (1942), <em>America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power.</em></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Strausz-Hupé (1942): <em>Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quincy Wright (1964 [1942]), <em>A Study of War.</em></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author/Editor</td>
<td>Title/Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Mead Earle, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert</td>
<td>Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Vose Gulick (1943)</td>
<td>The Balance of Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Lippmann (1943)</td>
<td>U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Mitrany (1943)</td>
<td>A Working Peace System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Google Books’ “Preview View” shows only the first 100 results.
* No electronic version available but a manual examination indicates more than 100 occurrences.
° Missing passages, amounting to about fifteen percent of the total, are due to the fact that Google Books’ “Snippet View” shows only three pages on which the searched term appears (although searching multiple formats sometimes reveals additional passages).
Appendix 2
“Anarchy” in Post-WWII IR (1946-1978)

Occurrences of “anarchy” and “anarchic” in books published between 1946 and 1978.
All electronically available passages are quoted from books with less than twenty occurrences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
<th>(Mean: 6.0. Median: 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hans J. Morgenthau (1946), <em>Scientific Man Versus Power Politics</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>“order under law’ as an alternative to the international anarchy of our age is reasonable only under the assumption that the international sphere already contains the social elements making for order and peace.” (117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Wight (1978 [1946]), <em>Power Politics</em>.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>[title in footnote]; (86) “International Anarchy” [chapter title]; (100) “the international scene is properly described as an anarchy;” (101) all particular causes of war operate within the context of international anarchy;” (102) “best described as ‘international anarchy’;” (105) international law establishes “a standard to which international anarchy should conform;” (109) “the alternatives to the balance of power are either universal anarchy or universal dominion;” (184) “the right of individual self-defence is the basic principle of international anarchy;” (218) “the international anarchy is restrained” by certain common interests; (289) “the world community is still an anarchy;” (293) [index entry] (305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grayson L. Kirk (1947), <em>The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans J. Morgenthau (1948), <em>Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.</em></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>“the horrors of disorder and anarchy;” (138) “to make relations between nations more peaceful and less anarchie;” (174) “if anarchy and violence are not to be the order of the day;” (210) “war and international anarchy;” (310, 361) “international anarchy and war;” (311) “abstract principles of justice … actually strengthened international anarchy by strengthening the antagonistic policies of individual nations;” (378) “order and anarchy, peace and war;” (431) [bibliography entries]. (485, 487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Butterfield (1950), <em>Christianity and History.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“sheer ungovernable anarchy;” (34) “problems of anarchy, disunity and external danger.” (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick S. Dunn (1950), <em>War and the Minds of Men.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Friedmann (1951), <em>An Introduction to World Politics.</em></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>“sink into anarchy;” (191) “economic anarchy;” (248) “anarchy and economic disaster.” (273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George F. Kennan (1951), <em>American Diplomacy, 1900-1950.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“disorder and anarchy” in China; (33) “the lurid fascination that manifestations of danger and anarchy always exert.” (149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans J. Morgenthau (1951), <em>In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“peace, law, and order vs. aggression, crime, and anarchy;” (102) “a long period of anarchy” in China. (203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dexter Perkins (1952), <em>The American Approach to Foreign Policy</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl W. Deutsch (1953), <em>Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Tannenbaum (1955), <em>The American Tradition in Foreign Policy.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl W. Deutsch (1957), <em>Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>“another popular notion is that a principal motive for the political integration of states has been the fear of anarchy, as well as warfare among them.” (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morton A. Kaplan</td>
<td>System and Process in International Politics</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. F. K. Organski</td>
<td>World Politics</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Brodie</td>
<td>Strategy in the Missile Age</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William T. R. Fox</td>
<td>Theoretical Aspects of International Relations</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John H. Herz</td>
<td>International Politics in the Atomic Age</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth N. Waltz</td>
<td>Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anatol Rapoport</td>
<td>Fights, Games, and Debates</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis F. Richardson</td>
<td>Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas C. Schelling</td>
<td>Strategy of Conflict</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James N. Rosenau (ed.)</td>
<td>International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenn H. Snyder</td>
<td>Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inis Claude</td>
<td>Power and International Relations</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inis Claude (1962), Power and International Relations

“A balance of power is in fact a kind of managed anarchy. But it is a system in which the anarchy invariably overcomes the management in the end;” (79) advocates of world government argue that “the world is in a state of anarchy;” (210) “in relations among nations complete anarchy still prevails” [quoting Einstein]; (210) “the characterization of the present-day world as a congeries of fully sovereign states existing in wholly anarchical relationships[] reveals the absence of “any serious … study of international relations;” (210-211) “would make a prudent scholar hesitate to proclaim that unmitigated anarchy prevails in the twentieth-century world;” (211) Einstein “did not establish the fact of anarchy and demonstrate the derivation of the world’s troubles from that fact, but he noted the troubles and assumed that their existence indicated a state of anarchy;” (211) talk of anarchy, however, “is typically the product not of ignorance, but of strong conviction;” (212) “the champions of world government who cry anarchy;” (212) they argue that “short of world government, one finds only varying forms of anarchy;” (212) “anarchy is a symbol of peril – the peril of uncontrollable
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author and Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arnold Wolfers (1962),</td>
<td>Disorder and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. H. Hinsley (1963),</td>
<td>Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst B. Haas (1964),</td>
<td>Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. W. Burton (1965),</td>
<td>International Relations: A General Theory</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley Hoffmann (1965),</td>
<td>The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout (1965),</td>
<td>The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: With Special Reference to International Politics.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond Aron (2003 [1966]),</td>
<td>Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (1966),</td>
<td>Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles A. McClelland (1966),</td>
<td>Theory and the International System.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker (1967),</td>
<td>Force, Order, and Justice.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. David Singer (ed.) (1968),</td>
<td>Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author/Editor</td>
<td>Title/Description</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James N. Rosenau (1971), John W. Burton (1972),</td>
<td><strong>The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy.</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1972),</td>
<td>Transnational Relations and World Politics.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Brodie (1973),</td>
<td>War and Politics.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John J. Weltman (1973),</td>
<td>Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Falk (1975),</td>
<td><em>A Study of Future Worlds.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Gilpin (1975),</td>
<td>U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson W. Polsby and Fred I. Greenstein (1975),</td>
<td>Handbook of Political Science, Volume 8: International Politics.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Jervis (1976),</td>
<td>Perception and Misperception in International Politics.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedley Bull (1977),</td>
<td>The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.</td>
<td>100+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1977),</td>
<td>Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen D. Krasner (1978),</td>
<td>Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Policy.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‡ Searching for “anarchy,” “anarchic,” and “anarchical” (which is by far Bull’s most common formulation). Google Books “Preview” only shows 100 occurrences.
Missing passages are due to the fact that Google Books' “Snippet View” shows only three pages in which the searched term appears (although searching multiple formats sometimes reveals additional passages).
Appendix 3
“Anarchy” in Contemporary IR (1979-2013)

Occurrences of “anarchy” and “anarchic” in leading books published between 1979 and 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book</th>
<th>Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), <em>Theory of International Politics.</em></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981), <em>The War Trap.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth A. Oye (1986), <em>Cooperation Under Anarchy.</em></td>
<td>100+‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert O. Keohane (1986), <em>Neorealism and Its Critics.</em></td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia H. Enloe (2001 [1989]), <em>Bananass, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.</em></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1989), <em>Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs.</em></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert H. Jackson (1990), <em>Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World.</em></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Buzan, Charles A. Jones and Richard Little (1993), <em>The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism.</em></td>
<td>100+‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Gill (1993), <em>Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations.</em></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John A. Vasquez (1993), <em>The War Puzzle.</em></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert W. Cox (1996), <em>Approaches to World Order.</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martha Finnemore (1996), <em>National Interests in International Society.</em></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Frankel (1996), <em>Realism: Restatements and Renewal.</em></td>
<td>100+‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenn H. Snyder (1997), <em>Alliance Politics.</em></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael N. Barnett (1998), <em>Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order.</em></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner (1999), <em>Exploration and Contestation in the...</em></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author/Monograph</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Wendt (1999)</td>
<td>Social Theory of International Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (2002)</td>
<td>Handbook of International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Tin-bor Hui (2005)</td>
<td>War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Deudney (2007)</td>
<td>Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (2008)</td>
<td>Oxford Handbook of International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beth A. Simmons (2009)</td>
<td>Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (2011)</td>
<td>International Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Linklater (2011)</td>
<td>The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (2013)</td>
<td>Handbook of International Relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: 35.5  
Median: 24  
‡ Google Books’ “Preview View” searches show only the first 100 results.
Appendix 4:
Three Subsets of Books

A. Pre-1979 Books with Less than Three Occurrences of “Anarchy” or “Anarchic”

0 Occurrences
(Hull 1908), (Reinsch 1911), (Butler 1912), (Angell 1914), (Hobson 1915), (Heatley 1919), (Bowman 1930), (Manning 1932), (Bernard and Bernard 1934), (Lasswell 1935), (Dunn 1937), (Manning 1937), (Bailey 1938), (Whittelsey 1939), (Srausz-Hupé 1942), (Lippmann 1943), (Mitrany 1944), (Fox 1944), (Kirk 1947), (Dunn 1950), (Perkins 1952), (Deutsch 1953), (Tannenbaum 1955), (Organski 1958), (Brodie 1959), (Rapoport 1960), (Richardson 1960), (Snyder 1961), (Haas 1964), (Sprout and Sprout 1965), (McClelland 1966), (Singer 1968), (Rosenau 1971), (Burton 1972), (Brodie 1973), (Gilpin 1975), (Keohane and Nye 1977).

1 Occurrence
(Trueblood 1899), (Reinsch 1900), (Angell 1910), (Mahan 1912), (Brailsford 1917 [1914]), (Woolf 1916), (Dickinson 1920), (Keynes 1920), (Moon 1925), (Noel-Baker 1928), (Ware 1934), (Morgenthau 1946), (Deutsch 1957), (Schelling 1960), (Boulding 1962), (Keohane and Nye 1972), (Weltman 1973).

2 Occurrences
(Hobson 1902), (Smuts 1918), (Lawrence 1919), (Mackinder 1919), (Hicks 1920), (Bryce 1922), (Zimmern 1922), (Brown 1923), (Buell 1925), (Moon 1926), (Delaisi 1927), (Potter 1929), (Wright 1930), (Muir 1932), (Lauterpacht 1933), (Zimmern 1936), (Carr 1964 [1946]), (Butterfield 1950), (Kennan 1951), (Morgenthau 1951), (Kaplan 1957), (Kissinger 1957), (Hoffmann 1965), (Osgood and Tucker 1967), (Falk 1975), (Krasner 1978).

B. Disorder as the Sense of “Anarchy” in Half or More of Total Occurrences
(Lawrence 1898 [1895], 56, 60, 205), (Moore 1898, vol. II, 1503, 1975, vol. III, 2929), (Trueblood 1899, 145), (Leacock 1906, 101, 112, 114-115, 289), (Angell 1910, 6), (Hill 1911, 26, 66, 137, 154-155, 173), (Mahan 1912, 114), (Brailsford 1917 [1914], 158), (Lipmann 1915, 151, 152), (Woolf 1916, xv), (Smuts 1918, 8), (Lawrence 1919, 143), (Mackinder 1919, 223), (Dickinson 1920, 27), (Hicks 1920, 7), (Keynes 1920, 255), (Angell 1921, 60, 98, 99, 181, 199, 237, 298, 301), (Bowman 1921, 2, 12, 34, 25, 44, 45, 47, 211, 219, 289, 385, 548), (Laski 1921, 13, 45, 72, 290), (Bryce 1922, 58, 71), (Gibbons 1922, 19, 109, 126, 135, 179, 180, 182, 212, 214, 246, 270, 350, 479), (Hobson 1922, 67, 199, 228, 252), (Walsh 1922, 57, 88, 123, 221), (Zimmern 1922, 22, 80), (Brown 1923, 159, 161), (Hill 1924, 18, 21), (Buell 1925, 46, 306), (Moon 1926, 395, 536), (Politis 1926, 6, 10), (Delaisi 1927, 62, 77), (Potter and West 1927, 267), (Potter 1929, 25), (Niebuhr 1932, 16, 18, 19, 21, 33, 129, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 175), (Muir 1932, 113, 122), (Lauterpacht 1933, 393, 438), (Russell 1936, 20, 198), (Wolters 1940, 216), (Carr 1964 [1946], 28, 162), (Earle, Craig, and Gilbert 1943, 33, 236, 332), (Butterfield 1950, 34, 63), (Friedmann 1951, 191, 248, 273), (Kennan 1951, 33, 149), (Morgenthau 1951, 102, 203), (Kaplan 1957, 49, 147), (Kissinger 1957, 17, 25), (Schelling 1960, 74), (Boulding 1962, 87), (Wolters 1962, 21, 53), (Aron 2003 [1966], 65, 122, 128, 199, 273, 327, 376, 377, 720), (Wallerstein 2011 [1976], 38, 177, 233).
C. Pre-1979 Books for which Full Text Electronic Editions are Available

(Lawrence 1898 [1895]), (Willoughby 1896), (Trueblood 1899), (Reinsch 1900), (Hobson 1902),
(Leacock 1906), (Hull 1908), (Angell 1910), (Hill 1911), (Butler 1912), (Reinsch 1911), (Mahan 1912),
(Angell 1914), (Hobson 1915), (Lippmann 1915), (Dickinson 1917 [1916]), (Grant et al. 1916),
(Woolf 1916), (Smuts 1918), (Lawrence 1919), (Mackinder 1919), (Follett 1920), (Hicks 1920),
(Keynes 1920), (Angell 1921), (Bowman 1921), (Laski 1921), (Bryce 1922), (Gibbons 1922), (Hobson
1922), (Potter 1922), (Walsh 1922), (Zimmerm 1922), (Niebuhr 1932), (Spykman 1942), (Wright 1964
[1942]), (Wight 1978 [1946]), (Herz 1959), (Waltz 1959), (Rapoport 1960), (Schelling 1960), (Hinsley
1977), (Krasner 1978).


Moon, Parker T. 1926. *Imperialism and World Politics*. Macmillan.


Wright, Quincy. 1930. *Research in International Relations since the War*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.


Appendix 5:
Twenty Common Definitions of “Anarchy”

Anarchy is regularly defined in contemporary IR as the absence of

government

a government
(Kim 1993, 58), (Kay 2004, 255), (Eckert 2006, 852; Kim 1993), (Cutler 2011, 47), (Staton and Moore 2011, 559).

a sovereign

a common authority

a higher authority

a central authority

an overarching authority

an enforcer

enforcement
(Keohane 1990, 193), (Cederman 1994, 504 n. 2), (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001: 766), (Snyder 2002, 14), (Mitzen 2013, 46).

common authority
(Keohane 1986, 1), (Christov 2005, 564), (Goodhart 2005, 56), (Guzzini 2012, 33), (Amstutz 2013, 13).

higher authority

overarching authority
(Buzan 1984: 112, 116), (Greco 1988, 497), (Snyder 2002, 7 n2), (Bromley 2004, 108), (Bickerton, Cunliffe, and Gorrevitch 2007a, 2).

central authority

superior authority

superordinate authority
(Haas 1991, 225), (Weinert 2007, 6), (Nardin 2008, 387), (Davenport 2013, 33), (Scheider and Spindler 2014, 6).

any higher authority

any supranational authority
(Mansfield 1993, 107), (Gowa 1994, 6), (Glenn 2009, 532), (Geldenhuys 2014, 354), (Wagner 2014, 107).

any central authority

any overarching authority
(Mandelbaum 1998-1999, 26), (Kahler and Lake 2004, 409), (Haubrich 2006, 84), (Kitchen 2010, 121), (Druzin 2014, 452).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hierarchy</td>
<td>(Waltz 1979, 93, 97, 100, 101), (Berejekian 1997, 789 n3), (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 187), (Stivachtis 2000, 101), (Mearsheimer 2002, 25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


